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Abstract Some metaphysicians believe that existence debates are easily resolved
by trivial inferences from Moorean premises. This paper considers how the intro-
duction of negative Moorean facts—negative existentials that command Moorean
certainty—complicates this picture. In particular, it shows how such facts, when
combined with certain plausible metaontological principles, generate a puzzle that
commits the proponents of this method to a contradiction.
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Are there any negative Moorean facts? The positive Moorean facts are familiar
enough: that I have hands, that there is time, motion, and a table before me. And
many would agree that there are negative facts. But negative Moorean facts? It
seems this question has gone unasked, yet an answer to it is presupposed by most
philosophers: it’s obviously not the case that there are some Fs. Familiar examples
abound: there are no such things as the Tooth Fairy or Santa Claus, past and future
times and objects, the fusion of your nose and the Eiffel Tower, or impossibilia—
perhaps, there are no such things as non-existent objects at all! I think it’s natural
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and plausible, then, to assume that if there are any positive Moorean facts, there are
negative Moorean facts too.1
In this paper, I’m interested in what follows once we take the idea of negative
Moorean facts seriously. In particular, I’m interested in how negative Moorean facts
make trouble for certain common sense approaches to ontology. Negative Moorean
facts, when combined with some other plausible metaontological principles, seem to
give rise to a puzzle which commits the Moorean metaphysician to a contradiction.
Escape involves either giving up some negative Moorean fact for a positive one, or
giving up some positive Moorean fact for a negative one. Either way, the cost is
one’s Mooreanism. Or, so I shall argue.
Here’s the plan. In Sect. 1, I get clear on the principles that underwrite certain
Moorean approaches to ontology. Drawing on these principles, I distinguish four
specific Moorean approaches and, in Sect. 2, I argue that the Moorean should reject
all but one. In Sect. 3, I present a puzzle that shows how the most plausible of these
approaches leads to a contradiction. In Sect. 4, I consider possible resolutions to the
puzzle and evaluate their plausibility without endorsing a specific solution. I
conclude in Sect. 5 by attempting to diagnose what I take the real source of
contention to be.
Some caveats before we begin. First, I’ll take Moorean or neo-Moorean idioms in
the vicinity—e.g., ‘‘Moorean facts,’’ ‘‘Moorean truths,’’ propositions that ‘‘com-
mand Moorean certainty’’ or are ‘‘obvious and undisputed,’’ ‘‘commonsensical’’ or
‘‘of common sense,’’ and propositions that correspond to our ‘‘ordinary, everyday
beliefs’’ and ‘‘what we ordinary believe’’—as all expressing (more or less) the same
idea: that some propositions express truths we just shouldn’t give up, even in the
face of sophisticated philosophical arguments to the contrary. Here, I refer to them
most frequently as ‘‘Moorean facts’’ and ‘‘Moorean truths.’’
Second, while I take the above gloss to capture the core epistemic commitments
of Mooreanism (see also Sect. 1), it shouldn’t be understood as a strict definition of
Mooreanism. I won’t offer such a definition here, nor will I provide any criteria for
distinguishing Moorean facts from non-Moorean ones. Neither is necessary for my
arguments to go through. Here and throughout, I’ll simply assume that we know
Moorean facts or truths when we see them.2
Finally, I’ll be assuming a package of highly plausible logico-ontological
principles: that quantification is ‘‘ontologically loaded,’’ as well as the principle of
existential generalization and the predication principle. This package should be
familiar—it’s orthodoxy—but, in Sect. 4, I’ll consider whether these principles are
1 Of course, some may doubt that Moorean facts—positive or negative—exist at all, or (if they do exist)
find their epistemological legitimacy highly questionable. On Sider’s (2013) view, for example, a theory’s
coherence with common sense counts for very little if it counts for anything at all. Furthermore, Conee
(2001: 58) worries that the criteria some use to identify Moorean propositions may turn out to be entirely
psychological. But we can put these worries aside here. In this paper, all I’m interested in is the
conditional claim: supposing there are Moorean facts (and that such facts are evidential) are there
negative Moorean facts in addition to the positive Moorean facts? And if so, what follows?
2 However, this isn’t to say that no helpful characterization of common sense or Moorean truth exists.
Compelling accounts are offered by both Kelly (2005, 2008) and Lycan (2001).
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our puzzle’s real culprits and whether rejecting them is a plausible way of dissolving
the puzzle. For now, however, I assume their cogency in my presentation of the
puzzle.
1 Mooreanism and trivialism: strong and weak
Some metaphysicians offer a sweeping way to settle existence debates. Their recipe
is simple. Suppose we’re after an answer to (Q):
(Q): Do composite objects (like tables) exist?
An answer to (Q), so these metaphysicians say, is easy to come by. Given the evident
fact that
(i) There are many tables before me.
it just follows that
(ii) There are tables.
The argument is valid, and its premise is clearly true. So, tables exist. As Jonathan
Schaffer attests, ‘‘contemporary existence debates are trivial, in that the entities in
question obviously do exist’’ (2009a: 357).
But why believe the premise(s) of easy ontological arguments like (i–ii) are true?
The kind of metaphysician I’m interested in here says premises like (i) express
something Moorean, they’re ‘‘one of the many facts which even philosophers
should not deny’’ (Armstrong 1978: 440–41), and that’s reason enough for believing
they’re true. That is, they endorse what I’ll call Moorean Ontological Arguments or
MOAs for short. MOAs are just easy ontological arguments whose premise(s) ex-
press a Moorean fact. I’ll call any metaphysician whose ontology is built from
MOAs, a Moorean metaphysician or just a Moorean for short.3
Think of easy ontological arguments like (i–ii) as a map charting the ontological
territory and Moorean principles as the reason for believing that the map is accurate.
It’s the support easy ontological arguments get from Moorean principles that make
MOAs a philosophical force to be reckoned with. Consider, for example, a
mereological nihilist’s argument for the non-existence of tables.4 No matter how
ingenious the argument, the Moorean instructs us not to budge. For denying that
there are tables means giving up on a premise that deserves greater credence than
any philosophical argument to the contrary. It means giving up on a premise we
already know is true. If arguments serve as evidence, the Moorean has common
3 That ontology can be read off of certain claims of common sense, or that ontology should be
constrained by common sense in some way has been endorsed or entertained (in some form or another) by
Fine (2001: 2–3, 2009), Hirsch (2002, 2005), Kelly (2008), Korman (2019, forthcoming), Lycan (2001),
Sattig (2015: 67–74), Schaffer (2009a, b: §4), and Thomasson (2007, 2015).
4 I discuss the revisionist’s strategy in more detail in Sect. 4. For a non-eliminative version of nihilism
see Contessa (2014).
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sense as evidence on their side. Those with revisionary inclinations must deny
known truths.
This dialectic is not unfamiliar. According to the Moorean, when it comes to
believing a proposition of common sense versus a philosophical thesis that
contradicts this proposition, the smart money is always on common sense:
No purely philosophical premise can ever (legitimately) have as strong a claim
to our allegiance as can a humble common-sense proposition such as Moore’s
autobiographical ones. Science can correct common sense; metaphysics and
philosophical ‘‘intuition’’ can only throw spitballs.
Lycan (2001: 41)
A simple point that Moore made in a number of papers is that our common
sense convictions have more epistemic weight than any fancy philosophical
arguments. Suppose you think you have an argument against the existence of
tables. Maybe there is some mistake in the argument that you haven’t seen.
That’s possible, isn’t it? What is more likely, that there is a mistake in the
argument or that there aren’t any tables? Moore thought that any sane person
who considers that question would soon realize that it is more reasonable to
abandon the argument than to abandon tables.
Hirsch (2002: 104)
It is a very fundamental part of the Moorean corpus that there is motion.
Things move. Perhaps we have still not, after two and a half thousand years,
got to the full bottom of Zeno’s brilliant arguments against the existence of
motion… But certainly Zeno should not persuade us that things do not move.
Neither should anybody else.
Armstrong (1999: 79)
[I]n this age of post-Moorean modesty, many of us are inclined to doubt that
philosophy is in possession of arguments that might genuinely serve to
undermine what we ordinarily believe. It may perhaps be conceded that the
arguments of the skeptic appear to be utterly compelling; but the Mooreans
among us will hold that the very plausibility of our ordinary beliefs is reason
enough for supposing that there must be something wrong in the skeptic’s
arguments, even if we are unable to say what it is. In so far, then, as the
pretensions of philosophy to provide a world-view rest upon its claims to be in
possession of the epistemological high ground, those pretensions had better be
given up.
Fine (2001: 2)
Here, without further ado, is a proof of the existence of numbers:
1. There are prime numbers.
2. Therefore there are numbers.
1 is a mathematical truism. It commands Moorean certainty, as being more
credible than any philosopher’s argument to the contrary. Any metaphysician
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who would deny it has ipso facto produced a reductio for her premises. And 2
follows immediately, by a standard adjective-drop inference. Thus numbers
exist. End of story.
Schaffer (2009a: 357)
The norm of belief revision in operation here seems to be something like this (where
p is a proposition that expresses a Moorean fact): any philosophical argument that is
at odds with p is either outright flawed or its premise(s) should not be believed. So
common sense is an indefeasible source of justification against philosophical
arguments to the contrary.5 More precisely, then, the Moorean seems to be
endorsing something like the following principle:
STRONG MOOREANISM
If p is a Moorean fact and q is the conclusion of a philosophical argument that
contradicts p, and S is deciding which proposition to believe, then S should
always believe p.
This formulation seems to gel best with the quoted material above, but also with the
attitude of many other Moorean sympathizers.6 It also leaves open the possibility
that scientific theses or arguments can be legitimate defeaters of Moorean truths,
which the Moorean seems comfortable conceding.7
But one may wonder whether this characterization of Mooreanism is too strong.
After all, for all the Moorean knows, there’s a philosophical argument out there with
revisionary implications whose premises all express Moorean facts. Is the Moorean
really so foolish to deny such a possibility? Other self-professed Mooreans might
think that it’s at least epistemically possible that a philosophical argument (with all
Moorean premises say) could come along and stir the pot. While this sort of
Moorean may ultimately admit the unlikelihood of such a possibility, it’s a
possibility in their eyes no less. So it seems that Mooreanism comes in weaker and
stronger blends. Perhaps such a Moorean would endorse:
WEAK MOOREANISM
If p is a Moorean fact and q is the conclusion of a philosophical argument that
contradicts p, and S is deciding which proposition to believe, then S should
almost always believe p (otherwise S should believe q or suspend belief in p).
5 Not indefeasible simpliciter: science is capable of overturning Moorean common sense. See footnote 7.
6 See Armstrong (2004: 26–30), Gupta (2006: 178), Kelly (2005, 2008), and Lewis (1973: 88, 1996:
549).
7 So, in principle, premises like (i) can be overturned if (in a bizarre turn of events) the Physical Review
were to come out claiming that the latest physics has debunked the existence of tables. Good work if you
can get it, but what’s left for philosophy? Why isn’t philosophy gifted these debunking capabilities? The
idea (so it goes) comes down to philosophy’s inferior track record: science produces results and
philosophy doesn’t. Many Mooreans seem to converge on this point. For an interesting argument showing
why philosophy can overturn Moorean common sense see Rinard (2013).
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Think of the proviso, ‘‘almost always,’’ as picking out the specific instances in
which the Moorean feels compelled to let a philosophical argument defeat a
Moorean premise—whatever those cases may end up being and however the
Moorean ends up deciding them.
In addition to STRONG MOOREANISM and WEAK MOOREANISM there’s another
important principle that seems to be endorsed by the Moorean—call it Trivialism:
philosophical existence debates are highly trivial because they can be resolved by
MOAs. By ‘‘resolved by MOAs’’ all I mean is that for any existence debate d1, …,
dn the Moorean can provide an MOA such that the MOA answers a ‘‘Does F exist?’’
question. Like our two Moorean principles above, Trivialism is also ambiguous,
admitting of strong and weak readings:
STRONG TRIVIALISM
All existence debates are highly trivial because they can be resolved by
MOAs.
WEAK TRIVIALISM
Some8 existence debates are highly trivial because they can be resolved by
MOAs.
What kinds of existence debates? If ‘‘all existence debates’’ is meant to refer,
unrestrictedly, to any sort of ‘‘Are there Fs?’’ question (where ‘‘F’’ can refer to just
about anything, e.g., the number of socks in my drawer, North Korean weapons of
mass destruction, etc.) then surely STRONG TRIVIALISM looks highly implausible. After
all, whether there are any North Korean weapons of mass destruction is by no means
trivially resolved, nor a question that MOAs are in the business of settling. I take it,
then, that this isn’t what proponents of either form of Trivialism have in mind by
‘‘existence debate.’’ Instead, I take it that they mean something closer to the
following: all philosophical existence debates. So, talk of ‘‘all’’ or ‘‘some’’ existence
debates should be understood with this restriction in mind.9
8 ‘‘Some’’ has its typical reading as ‘‘at least one.’’ But obviously if only one existence debate is resolved
by an MOA, WEAK TRIVIALISM would be an extremely uninteresting principle. Perhaps, by ‘‘some’’ the
Moorean means something closer to ‘‘most,’’ as in exactly or more than half.
9 But even this restriction isn’t restrictive enough. Though ‘‘philosophical existence debates’’ narrows the
target of Trivialism somewhat, it still leaves much to be desired. If pressed further, here are some
additional (vague and non-exhaustive) restrictions we might impose on our target: (a) debates that are
determinately and distinctly philosophical, i.e., it’s fairly clear that science—broadly construed—is
incapable of settling them; (b) debates that only philosophers, analytic metaphysicians in particular,
professionally engage in, i.e., debates that have been addressed in journals, presented at conferences, etc.;
(c) debates that don’t overlap with those that the general public might engage in, e.g., are there aliens,
god(s), or souls?; and (d) debates that might strike the general public as having mostly obvious answers,
e.g., are there tables?
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Thus, we are left with four possible Moorean metaontologies:
MM1 MM2
STRONG MOOREANISM STRONG MOOREANISM
STRONG TRIVIALISM WEAK TRIVIALISM
MM3 MM4
WEAK MOOREANISM WEAK MOOREANISM
STRONG TRIVIALISM WEAK TRIVIALISM
Which approach is the target of this paper? In the next section, I’ll argue that no
self-respecting Moorean should endorse the weak versions of these principles. This
leaves us with what I believe to be the appropriate target of this paper, the Moorean
approach deserving of serious philosophical consideration: MM1, or STRONG
MOOREANISM with STRONG TRIVIALISM. Unfortunately, however, as I’ll show in Sect. 3,
MM1 entails a contradiction and is thus false.
Alternatively, this paper could be understood as presenting the Moorean with the
following dilemma:
Either MM1 is contradictory, thus false, or
MM2 and MM3 and MM4 are consistent, but implausible.
Obviously this is bad news for the Moorean. If they can’t find a way to make one of
the above approaches work, Moorean metaontology looks like a nonstarter.
2 Assessing the approaches
Let’s start with what I take to be the most implausible of the weak, MM3: WEAK
MOOREANISM with STRONG TRIVIALISM. Together, these two principles yield the
following: all and only philosophical existence debates can be resolved by Moorean
principles; all other philosophical debates may (or may not be) resolved by such
principles.
Yet, it’s a bit strange—ad-hoc even—to maintain one’s Mooreanism exclusively
in the context of existence debates and not other philosophical debates. Why are
existence debates more susceptible to Moorean reconciliation than other philo-
sophical debates? Is there a special feature unique only to existence debates that
somehow makes them more responsive to Moorean solutions than other philosoph-
ical debates? It’s hard to take these questions seriously. Consider three distinct
philosophical debates: Do properties exist? Are some moral truths self-evident? Do
we have knowledge of the external world? Imagine only letting your Mooreanism
settle the first debate (say, the existence of properties is entailed by certain Moorean
facts like the following: there are properties that you and I share). But Mooreanism
just as easily settles the remaining two debates. One might reason as follows:
‘‘murdering children for fun is wrong’’ is just obviously true; indeed, it’s a Moorean
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fact. Therefore, some moral truths are self-evident. And: that I have hands is just
obviously true; indeed it’s a Moorean fact. So, if having hands entails that there is an
external world, and I know that I have hands, then I have knowledge of the external
world. Of course, there may be something independently objectionable about using
Mooreanism to settle such debates, but the point is just that it’d be strange to restrict
one’s Mooreanism only to existence debates.
Moving on, we have MM2, STRONG MOOREANISM with WEAK TRIVIALISM, which
entails the following: some existence debates can’t be resolved by MOAs because
there is no MOA—or no Moorean proposition(s)—that corresponds to/resolves
those existence debates.
MM2 is certainly more plausible than the last. Intuitively, it at least seems as if
MOAs are incapable of resolving some philosophical existence debates. Consider the
debate over the existence of concrete possible worlds. Surely, this is a philosophical
existence debate that no MOA can or will resolve. But I think this is a mistake. It’s a
mistake because it’s unclear whether this debate is, at its core, philosophical or
empirical. If it’s the latter, then the Moorean will leave it up to science (perhaps
cosmology) to settle it. But suppose it’s really the former. Then I think common sense
does rule it out: according to common sense, there are possibilities to be sure, but to
analyze them as concrete possible worlds goes far beyond the jurisdiction of common
sense. So, it turns out that common sense does rule out concrete possible worlds or else
the question is in the hands of science and therefore outside the scope of Trivialism.
Perhaps there are other philosophical existence debates that I’m overlooking that are
more determinately philosophical that MOAs can’t resolve. But given the relevant
sense of ‘‘existence debate’’10 it’s hard to see how there isn’t at least one MOA in the
vicinity capable of resolving them.
Enter now the most plausible of the weak, MM4, WEAK MOOREANISM with WEAK
TRIVIALISM, which says that some existence debates can’t be resolved by MOAs and
some Moorean facts can be overturned by radical philosophical arguments to the
contrary (or rationally suspended until further notice).
Unlike the previous two approaches, MM4 has a lot going for it. But what’s
gained in plausibility is lost in credibility. The problem with MM4 is that it’s simply
not Moorean enough. Indeed, in principle, MM4 can accommodate a number of
metaphysical positions that should, by the Moorean’s lights, be deemed too radical
to be taken seriously. MM4 permits one to be both a mereological nihilist and a
believer in numbers, a modal realist and a believer in properties, a nominalist and a
believer in tables. Yet, these ontologies are far from deserving the Moorean title.
So, the weak principles just seem too weak. This isn’t to say that they’re all lost
causes. Indeed, I challenge the Moorean to mitigate some of the offenses
enumerated here. Nevertheless, in light of the considerations above, I take the
real target here to be MM1: STRONG MOOREANISM with STRONG TRIVIALISM.
Unlike its weak version, STRONG MOOREANISM better captures the epistemological
commitments of the Moorean. It (rightly) prohibits any negotiation from taking
place between the Moorean and other radical ontological/epistemological positions
10 See footnote 9 for the relevant sense.
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(e.g., nihilism and skepticism). The modal force of ‘‘must’’ and ‘‘can’’ in the
passages from Fine and Lycan above,11 for example, strongly imply that in no
circumstance whatsoever should the Moorean concede to the revisionary. The
Moorean doesn’t negotiate with any kind of skeptic.
And STRONG TRIVIALISM, unlike its weak version, offers the Moorean a systematic
way of doing ontology. This is because Trivialism is a metaontological principle,
and metaontological principles are general guides to doing ontology. Trivialism,
then, should tell the Moorean how to settle existence debates full-stop. For if only
some existence debates are highly trivial, not only does Trivialism risk collapsing
into a philosophically uninteresting thesis, but MOAs no longer look like a
principled way of settling existence debates.12
So, though MM1 is seemingly more extreme than the other approaches, it has
virtues the others lack: its commitments are clear and its approach is sufficiently
principled. Moreover, it seems better supported by those who embrace Mooreanism.
3 The puzzle
Consider again argument (i–ii). We’re supposed to believe that tables exist on the
basis of the argument’s premise. The premise is supposed to be obviously true—it
commands Moorean certainty—so we should believe it. So, we should believe
whatever this true premise entails: that there are tables.
But just as common sense corroborates many positive existential claims, so too, I
think, it corroborates many negative existential claims. Common sense—as
ontologically inclusive as it can be—excludes many things from reality. Paradig-
matic examples include (inter alia) mythical and fictional things, past and future
things/times, and impossible objects. Of course, this hasn’t stopped philosophers
from debating the existence of these things. My point is simply that, from the
purview of common sense, it’s obviously not the case that there exist some Fs. I take
it, then, that there are certain negative Moorean facts of the form, ‘‘Fs don’t exist’’
or ‘‘There are no Fs.’’
I turn now to the puzzle. To keep things clean and simple, I focus just on fictional
things like the Tooth Fairy.13 And to keep things intuitive, I focus on singular
propositions with the understanding that they can be transformed into general
propositions. It will also be helpful to have in front of us the commitments of the
Moorean approach in question:
11 Consider: ‘‘[T]here must be something wrong in the skeptic’s arguments, even if we are unable to say
what it is’’ (Fine 2001: 2) and ‘‘No purely philosophical premise can ever (legitimately) have as strong a
claim to our allegiance as can a humble common-sense proposition’’ (Lycan 2001: 41, my emphasis).
12 In a slightly different context, Fairchild and Hawthorne (2018) argue against ontological conservatism
on grounds that it’s too particularist. I suspect something similar is going on with WEAK TRIVIALISM. Hence,
perhaps, another reason to favor STRONG TRIVIALISM.
13 Technically, the Tooth Fairy is a creature of myth rather than one of fiction. But nothing important to
my argument turns on this distinction.
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MM1
STRONG MOOREANISM
If p is a Moorean fact and q is the conclusion of a philosophical argument that
contradicts p, and S is deciding which proposition to believe, then S should
always believe p.
STRONG TRIVIALISM
All existence debates are highly trivial because they can be resolved by
MOAs.
Now, just as much as common sense giveth, common sense taketh away. We
granted this above. Common sense therefore licenses us to count the following
claim as true, i.e., as one expressing a negative Moorean fact:
(r) The Tooth Fairy doesn’t exist.
But consider now this positive Moorean fact:
(p) The Tooth Fairy is fictional.
From which it follows that:
(q) The Tooth Fairy exists.
What results is an inconsistent Moorean triad. (q) is obviously in conflict with what
we ordinarily believe: that the Tooth Fairy doesn’t exist. What to do? Denying
(p) saves (r) but at the cost of contradicting common sense. But saving (p) means
giving up (r) which comes at the same cost. Do we kill one Moorean fact to save
another? To dissolve the paradox, the Moorean must either reject (r) or else deny
(p). From the standpoint of common sense, both options seem untenable. Slightly
more formally:14
(1) STRONG MOOREANISM and STRONG TRIVIALISM are true. (assume for reductio)
(2) If STRONG MOOREANISM is true then the Tooth Fairy doesn’t exist.
(3) If STRONG MOOREANISM is true then the Tooth Fairy is fictional.
(4) Therefore, the Tooth Fairy is fictional. (from 1, 3)
(5) If STRONG TRIVIALISM is true and the Tooth Fairy is fictional, then the Tooth
Fairy exists.
(6) Therefore, the Tooth Fairy exists. (from 4, 5)
(7) Therefore, the Tooth Fairy doesn’t exist. (from 1, 2)
(8) Therefore, the Tooth Fairy exists and the Tooth Fairy doesn’t exist. (from 6, 7)
(9) Therefore, STRONG MOOREANISM and STRONG TRIVIALISM are false. (from 1, 8)
Thus, the conjunction of STRONG MOOREANISM and STRONG TRIVIALISM entails a
contradiction.
With necessary alterations, the puzzle generalizes to other categories of entity:
past and future things/times, impossible objects, and whatever else obviously
14 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting I formalize the puzzle this way.
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doesn’t exist.15 Consider, for example, past and future things/times. Our common-
sensical conception of time and temporal experience support the belief that past and
future things/times don’t exist.16 Yet, it’s a Moorean fact that some present objects
stand in certain relations to past objects, e.g., I’m taller than Socrates. But to say
this presupposes some past object (e.g., Socrates). But past objects don’t exist!
(Also a Moorean fact.) Of course, they did exist, but they don’t now exist which is
just to say they don’t exist period. Likewise for future things/times. So, we have an
inconsistent Moorean triad.
Impossible objects don’t exist either. How could the round square exist? For it to
exist there would have to be something that has the property of being both round
and square which is, well, impossible. Nothing is or can be both round and square.
So, the round square doesn’t exist. That’s a Moorean fact. Yet, it’s also a Moorean
fact that the round square is an impossible object. But this presupposes the existence
of the round square! So, we have an inconsistent Moorean triad.
What does the puzzle show? Well, that if Moorean facts cut both ways—if there
are both negative and positive Moorean facts—then, when combined with the
aforementioned principles, they seem to force the Moorean to give up some of those
facts (either some set of the negative facts or some set of the positive facts) to avoid
contradiction. But no Moorean should have to do that. The Moorean shouldn’t have
to abandon any of the Moorean facts. What makes such facts Moorean is precisely
their foundational and irrevocable status.17
There’s also a second consequence of the puzzle. Consider again what MOAs are
supposed to establish: that existence debates are trivial. They’re trivial because
they’re easily resolved by MOAs. But the MOAs above seem to establish just the
opposite: existence debates aren’t trivial because they can’t be easily resolved by
the very MOAs that are supposed to easily resolve them.
So, the Moorean seems to have a puzzle on their hands.
4 Possible resolutions
I want to now consider some possible resolutions to the puzzle. Though I don’t think
any one approach decisively resolves the puzzle, I won’t shy away from indicating
which approaches I find most promising. I’ll start first by discussing some possible
epistemic solutions then transition to solutions that are more metaontological.
15 Maybe even non-existent objects themselves. Consider the sentence ‘‘The Tooth Fairy is non-existent’’
which some believe implies the existence of at least one non-existent object (e.g., the Tooth Fairy). But
non-existent objects don’t exist—they’re not objects of any kind, they’re nothing!
16 Saint Augustine concurs: ‘‘[I]t is abundantly clear that neither the future nor the past exist, and
therefore it is not strictly correct to say that there are three times, past, present, and future’’
(Augustine 1961, Book XI §20: 269). Presentists do too. One of the cited upshots of the presentist view is
that it coheres with common sense. (Of course, this is also what gets the presentist into trouble. If past
things/times don’t exist, it’s not clear what could make sentences like ‘‘Caesar crossed the Rubicon’’ true.
Likewise for sentences about the future.) See Zimmerman (2008) for further discussion.
17 Although, see footnote 5.
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4.1 Easy belief
The Moorean might try sidestepping the puzzle by deferring to a principle like the
following:
EASY BELIEF
If a premise p of some MOA expresses a Moorean fact, but its conclusion
q doesn’t, then S should nevertheless believe q on the basis of p because
p expresses a Moorean fact.
Consider argument (p–q) again. Its premise ‘‘The Tooth Fairy is fictional’’ expresses
a Moorean fact while its conclusion ‘‘The Tooth Fairy exists’’ clashes with another
Moorean fact ‘‘The Tooth Fairy doesn’t exist.’’ EASY BELIEF tells us that we should
believe the conclusion of (p–q) simply because its premise respects a Moorean fact.
But EASY BELIEF is implausible on two fronts. First, (r)—like (p)—expresses a
Moorean fact. So respecting the Moorean facts can’t be used as a condition for
rejecting (r) here since (r) itself is a Moorean fact. Second, even if (q) is a
conclusion that is deduced by S why should S believe (q) when S believes more
strongly in (r)? That is, if we are more certain of our belief in the proposition ‘‘The
Tooth Fairy doesn’t exist’’ why believe otherwise? If common sense counts in favor
of truth and one is more certain of propositions which respect common sense than
those that don’t, it seems irrational to believe otherwise, especially when certainty
about (r) is stronger than mere belief in (q).
I anticipate the following rejoinder: ‘‘But (q) is the logical entailment of
something we believe to be true, namely, (p), and if we know (p) to be true, and
we’re in a position to know what follows from (p), then are we not justified in
believing that (q) is true?’’
The problem with this line of reasoning is that we’re both justified in believing
that (q) is true and also that (r) is true. On the one hand, it’s commonsensical to say
that the Tooth Fairy is fictional. And since something isn’t nothing then it seems we
have evidence that something exists, namely, the Tooth Fairy. So, given that the
former claim is supported by common sense, we’re justified in believing it, hence
we’re justified in believing the entailment of that claim: fictional things like the
Tooth Fairy exist. On the other hand, it’s commonsensical to say that the Tooth
Fairy doesn’t exist. The Tooth Fairy is, after all, thought not to exist for good
reason: it’s made-up! And made-up things don’t exist. Because our evidence for
both claims is underdetermined we seem justified in believing either one. Therefore,
believing (q) on the grounds that it’s entailed by (p) (assuming our belief in (p) is
justified) isn’t enough to decide the matter.
4.2 Plausibility
Perhaps the Moorean might retreat to a different sort of principle:
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PLAUSIBILITY
If at least one premise p of some MOA is less plausible than the denial of its
conclusion q, then S shouldn’t believe the premise of that MOA (otherwise
S should believe it).18
PLAUSIBILITY seems to do the trick for familiar MOAs like (i–ii). Is ‘‘There are many
tables before me’’ less plausible than ‘‘Tables don’t exist’’? No. So, the Moorean
should believe the premise of that MOA for the existence of tables.
Unfortunately, however, this move proves to be fruitless in the end as
PLAUSIBILITY yields the same puzzling results. Consider again (p–q):
(p) The Tooth Fairy is fictional.
(q) Therefore, the Tooth Fairy exists.
With the updated decision procedure in place we can ask: Is (p) less plausible than
the negation of (q)? That is, is (p) less plausible than (r)?
(r) The Tooth Fairy doesn’t exist.
It’s indeterminate given that (p) seems equally as plausible as (r). So PLAUSIBILITY
gets the Moorean no closer to solving the puzzle.
So much for the epistemic route. On now to a different strategy: the
metaontological route. If there is a solution to our puzzle at all, I suspect it resides
here.
4.3 Paraphrase
One very natural response to the puzzle is to paraphrase.19 Quine taught us that
when we’re in an ontological bind we can eschew ontological commitment by
locating an appropriate paraphrase. To avoid commitment to holes, for example, we
might paraphrase ‘‘There are many holes in my sock’’ into ‘‘My sock is multiply-
perforated.’’ The Moorean might be tempted by a similar strategy. Perhaps there is a
more natural translation of ‘‘The Tooth Fairy is fictional’’ that doesn’t quantify over
or entail the existence of the Tooth Fairy. Perhaps, then, the Moorean should only
consider propositions that have first been vetted by paraphrase: if p is a Moorean
fact but has a paraphrase p* that isn’t ontologically committing, then it shouldn’t be
used as a premise in an MOA.20
18 If you find the plausibility relation too underspecified, feel free to substitute it with ‘‘certainty’’ or
some other relevant epistemic notion.
19 The difference between reconciliatory and revisionary paraphrase matters here: the former aims to
keep the original (unparaphrased) sentences true, while the latter renders them false. (See Keller
(2010, 2015, 2016) for discussion of the differences.) The revisionary approach is likely to be of no
interest to the Moorean since it would entail the falsity of some Moorean propositions. And while the
reconciliatory approach looks initially promising, the Moorean might find that it fails in much the same
way as other reconciliatory-inspired approaches, such as the fundamentalist approach considered in
Sect. 4.5.
20 Thanks to an anonymous referee for prompting me to reconsider this objection.
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But paraphrase seems antithetical to the Moorean approach to ontology in at least
two ways. The Moorean deals in Moorean facts. These are facts that are meant to be
unambiguous by design. Indeed, it’s for this reason that they seem so compelling:
they’re true, obviously, as stated, no paraphrase necessary.21
Suppose, however, we were to grant the Moorean their paraphrases. If paraphrase
is permissible, we might wonder what work MOAs are doing for the Moorean.
Paraphrase enters the scene as a strategy for retaining one’s preferred ontology.
That is, before one paraphrases, one already has an ontology in mind that one
intends the paraphrase to respect (hence the motivation to paraphrase away the
existence of holes). Yet, the whole upshot of the Moorean approach is to use MOAs
to settle existence debates. Mooreans employ MOAs to determine what exists.
Paraphrase undermines this whole approach by forgoing MOAs altogether: with
paraphrase, the Moorean picks and chooses their ontology ahead of time as opposed
to letting ontology come to them by putting MOAs to work. It’s not clear, then, how
helpful paraphrase would be here to the Moorean.
4.4 Pluralism
Suppose instead that we were to make a distinction between what existsC and what
existsA where ‘‘existsC’’ means something like ‘‘exists concretely’’ and where
‘‘existsA’’ means something like ‘‘exists abstractly.’’ The Moorean could then take
(r) to mean:
(r)* The Tooth Fairy doesn’t existC.
And if the quantifiers in (p–q) are taken to express ‘‘existsA’’ then the contradiction
disappears and the puzzle is resolved. Call this the ontological pluralist approach.22
Ontological pluralism says there are multiple ways for something to be. Some things
exist concretely and other things exist abstractly, but make no mistake: both exist.
I think there are good, independent reasons for the Moorean not to adopt
pluralism.23 Nevertheless, we can still ask: should the Moorean go pluralist for the
simple reason that it resolves our puzzle? It’s not clear they should. I assume what
makes (r) a Moorean fact is that it says the Tooth Fairy doesn’t exist in any sense at
all—not that it exists in some sense. Moreover, I don’t think it’s exactly
commonsensical to hold that the Tooth Fairy, if it does exist, exists as an abstract
object, outside of space (and perhaps time). If in order to resolve the puzzle the
Moorean has to invoke strange, commonsensically dubious entities then the move to
pluralism doesn’t seem worth it.
21 See Schaffer (2009a: 357) for a similar line of reasoning.
22 See McDaniel (2017) and Turner (2010) for a defense of ontological pluralism.
23 See Merricks (2019) for critical discussion, much of which I’m sympathetic to.
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4.5 Fundamentalism
Could going ‘‘fundamental’’ escape the problem? Some metaphysicians make a
distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental quantification.24 Call these
metaphysicians fundamentalists. According to the fundamentalist, different senses
of ‘‘there are/there exists’’ are invoked when making existential claims. For
example, the quantifier we use when we’re metaphysically serious can be dubbed
the ‘‘fundamental quantifier’’—it’s the quantifier that ‘‘carves at the joints.’’ When
one denies the existence of tables, then, one is denying that fundamentally-speaking
tables exist. But when one isn’t doing metaphysics, and is out in the wild, furniture
shopping (say), one’s assertion that ‘‘There are many tables before me’’ doesn’t
entrap you in contradiction, for it doesn’t commit you to tables. Here only a non-
fundamental, ordinary sense of the quantifier is in use. And while what was said was
literally and strictly true, it isn’t ontologically deep or serious.
Why is fundamentalism relevant to the Moorean? Because having our ordinary
common sense propositions come out true is one of the main motivations to go
fundamental. Fundamentalists with revisionary inclinations (i.e., those who want to
deny the existence of tables, numbers, and so on) want to hold on to the literal truth
of common sense propositions that we (and they) all utter outside the seminar room.
They would also like to be able to express their deep ontological commitments
which seem to contradict these ordinary claims. To do both, they invoke the
fundamental/non-fundamental distinction. Thus, the fundamentalist who doesn’t
like fictional things bloating their ontology might say ‘‘The Tooth Fairy exists’’ is
true non-fundamentally-speaking (and therefore doesn’t entail ontological commit-
ment to fictional things) but false fundamentally-speaking, for fundamentally-
speaking, the Tooth Fairy doesn’t exist. Puzzle solved.
The fundamentalist move is incredibly tempting. But the Moorean has good
reason to be suspicious. For what good is the Moorean approach to ontology if it has
nothing to do with ontology? If Moorean facts like ‘‘There are many tables before
me’’ don’t entail the existence of tables (in the fundamental sense) they seem
useless to the Moorean who’d like to include such entities in their ontology—and
include them on the basis of their entailment from claims that command Moorean
certainty. The reason for believing in such entities is because they follow from such
claims. The problem with fundamentalism, then, is that it seems to ask too much of
the Moorean. For while it sidesteps the puzzle, it does so by radically reforming the
scope and application of Moorean common sense. It then becomes quickly unclear
what exactly the upshot of fundamentalism is supposed to be if the Moorean image
it alleges to preserve is one the Moorean can’t recognize.25
24 See Cameron (2008, 2010), Dorr (2007), Fine (2001, 2009), and Sider (2009, 2011, 2013) for different
but related strategies. See also van Inwagen (1990) for the locus of compatibilist-inspired strategies like
these.
25 See also Korman (2015a, b, forthcoming) for critical discussion of the fundamentalist approach.
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4.6 Neutralism
Maybe a solution to our puzzle requires a departure from orthodoxy. That is, maybe
rejecting the plausible logico-ontological principles we assumed from the outset
(that quantification is ‘‘ontologically loaded,’’ that the principle of existential
generalization and the predication principle are sound) will set the Moorean
metaphysician free. Suppose, then, we were to adopt a different view of
quantification altogether—quantifier neutralism.26 Quantifier neutralism is just the
view that quantification in natural and formal language is ontologically neutral, and
thus not ontologically committing. The neutralist, then, rejects the package of
logico-ontological principles we assumed from the start.
According to one sort of neutralist, quantificational expressions like ‘‘some,’’ ‘‘there
are,’’ and ‘‘A’’ don’t mean there exists and therefore don’t entail ontological commitment.
Instead, existence is a predicate, ‘‘E,’’ and ontological commitment is induced (or thwarted)
by attaching that predicate to expressions in the following way: Ax (Fx ^ Ex). In English:
‘‘There is something (e.g., the number 3) such that it is prime and it exists.’’ Or if we think
numbers don’t exist: Ax (Fx ^ *Ex). In English: ‘‘There is something (e.g., the number 3)
such that it is prime and it doesn’t exist.’’ Thus, for the neutralist under consideration here,
the domain of quantification includes both existent and non-existent things.
Neutralism has a seemingly elegant solution to the puzzle: ‘‘The Tooth Fairy is
fictional’’ doesn’t entail ‘‘The Tooth Fairy exists.’’ All the former entails is that
there is at least one non-existent fictional object in our domain of quantification. So,
according to the neutralist, there is no inconsistent Moorean triad, for the inference
is blocked: (q) ‘‘The Tooth Fairy exists,’’ is false and is in no way entailed by
(p) ‘‘The Tooth Fairy is fictional.’’ Being non-existent doesn’t preclude an object
from having properties. Non-existent objects like the Tooth Fairy can have
properties such as the property of being fictional.
Yet, neutralism seems to suffer a similar fate as fundamentalism. For I doubt the
Moorean will like that (by the neutralist’s lights) Moorean truths such as ‘‘There are
many tables before me’’ don’t entail the existence of tables.27
26 The neutralist approach presented here is of the Meinongian sort and distinguishes being from existence
in addition to holding that non-existent objects have genuine properties. But neutralism and Meinongianism
aren’t a package deal. For a defense of anti-Meinongian neutralism see Azzouni (1994, 2004, 2017). See also
Fine (2009) for a nuanced view in the vicinity. For more classic Meinongian-inspired views see Crane
(2012, 2013), Finn (2017), Priest (2005, 2008), and Routley (1980, 1982).
27 Suppose, however, a compromise is reached. Maybe according to the neutralist ‘‘tables exist’’ is true not
because it was deduced from any MOA but because tables just exist! That is, instead of inferring the
conclusion ‘‘tables exist’’ from a Moorean premise ‘‘There are many tables before me’’ the neutralist can
simply insist that ‘‘tables exist’’ is true because it just expresses a brute Moorean fact.
I think this strategy will only take the neutralist so far. For consider how such a neutralist might arrive at
this truth. Plausibly, they might do so on the basis of having some perceptual experience: they see that this
table exists in front of them. But consider now other sorts of entities like properties and numbers. Here, such a
neutralist couldn’t help themselves to a similar response. One doesn’t see that properties exist. One deduces
their existence from other, more basic (Moorean) facts, e.g., this apple is red and that car is red, so there is a
property—redness—that both objects share. So, while ‘‘properties exist’’ might very well be a Moorean truth
of its own, it’s one that is entailed by some other more basic set of Moorean truths. Yet, the neutralist can’t
grant this since such inferences are blocked by their alleged ontological neutrality.
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4.7 No negative Moorean facts
If the puzzle only gets started if negative Moorean facts are countenanced (and
(r) ‘‘The Tooth Fairy doesn’t exist’’ is a paradigmatic instance of one), then one
might be inclined to do away with negative Moorean facts completely. Maybe there
aren’t any such facts at all. Maybe negative Moorean facts are too philosophically
controversial to be considered genuine Moorean facts. The positive Moorean facts
are just less divisive. Then, the puzzle would fail since one could just deny (r).28
This move, however, strikes me as desperate. Mooreans don’t need to agree on
all the Moorean facts, be they positive or negative ones. Disputes, ‘‘in-house’’
disputes especially, come with the territory. So, ‘‘being controversial,’’ shouldn’t
preclude negative existentials from being ascribed Moorean status. Moreover,
failure to countenance negative Moorean facts seems to lead to a failure to explain
the great efforts philosophers have gone to to keep negative existentials true. The
sophisticated logical acrobatics of Russell and Quine were seemingly performed out
of respect for the negative Moorean facts: that Pegasus and the present King of
France really don’t exist in any sense at all. No ancient puzzle was ever going to
stop them from believing otherwise. Perhaps, this is why any ‘‘solution’’ that turns
on denying true negative existentials feels so unsatisfying. For it fails to
accommodate a desideratum that any even remotely plausible solution must
accommodate: that some things don’t exist.
The Moorean seems backed into a corner. With no way to override the puzzle,
MOAs look like an inconsistent and ineffectual way of settling existence debates.
5 Concluding remarks
Inconsistent beliefs aren’t anything new. When we discover an inconsistency in our
belief system, we update it accordingly, shoring up the unwanted inconsistency by
deciding to endorse some propositions and rejecting others. In the cases above,
however, it’s unclear how exactly we might do this: MM1 seems to allow no wiggle
room. What, then, to make of our puzzle? Assuming that the other three approaches
are off the table, either Mooreanism or Trivialism—or both—must go!
The dilemma, recall, is this: the Moorean can’t consistently maintain that
(r) ‘‘The Tooth Fairy doesn’t exist’’ and (p) ‘‘The Tooth Fairy is fictional’’ are true.
For the latter, positive Moorean fact entails the existence of the Tooth Fairy, which
contradicts the former, negative Moorean fact. In order to slip out of the
contradiction, then, it looks like the Moorean has to give one fact up for the other.
But Moorean facts are irrevocable (at least no philosophical argument is capable of
overturning them). So, giving up either fact isn’t an option for the Moorean.
28 Of course, to deny (r) the Moorean needn’t do away with negative Moorean facts completely. For they
might agree that negative Moorean facts exist but disagree that (r) is one of them. One can also go in the
other direction and deny that (p) ‘‘The Tooth Fairy is fictional’’ is a Moorean fact. But I think this is just
as implausible as denying that (r) is a Moorean fact.
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Perhaps, then, some would like to keep Trivialism and give up Mooreanism: easy
ontological arguments like (i–ii) get by just fine without Moorean principles.
But then we might wonder why the premise(s) of such arguments are true. Why
believe them? What’s doing the justificatory work? If it isn’t Mooreanism, or if it’s
something weaker than Mooreanism, proponents of easy ontological arguments
should be open to potentially revising their ontological beliefs in the face of radical
but compelling philosophical arguments to the contrary. (Recall that proponents of
MOAs are unwilling to concede this since it would mean giving up on some
Moorean truths.) Yet, I assume that those interested in Trivialism are interested in
easy ontological arguments because they seem like a compelling way of settling
existence debates. But if revising one’s ontological beliefs in the face of such
arguments is a real option, why think such debates are ‘‘trivial’’ or ‘‘easily resolved’’
in the first place?
Maybe others would be tempted to give up Trivialism and keep Mooreanism.
Maybe all existence debates are highly non-trivial. Or maybe existence debates are
all trivial in some other way than what Trivialism suggests.29 Whatever the case, the
proponent of such a view has modest aspirations: Mooreanism settles some
philosophical debates to be sure, but which ones? I take it that those attracted to this
approach recommend patience: answers are to be discovered piecemeal, on a case-
to-case basis.
One last way forward is to embrace some general form of anti-Mooreanism and
anti-Trivialism. Anti-Mooreanism because common sense doesn’t count for much;
anti-Trivialism because existence debates are highly non-trivial.
How would an approach like this one play out? Well, everyone can agree that
common sense is an acceptable starting point. (What else is one supposed to lean on
at the beginning of inquiry?) But instead of letting common sense stubbornly dictate
what, in the final analysis, there is and what there isn’t, it should be renegotiated
when new evidence comes along. For instance, J.R.G. Williams suggests that the
real Moorean challenge ought to focus not on the relative justification of one’s
beliefs but when and under what conditions it is rational to change these beliefs.30
With the right sort of philosophical argument, then, it should be permissible to give
up our belief in certain Moorean propositions.31,32 Of course, much turns on fleshing
out the ‘‘what’’ and ‘‘when’’ of rational belief change. For if the conditions are too
29 Korman (forthcoming) seems to endorse a view like this one.
30 Although note that Williams goes on to develop a compatibilist strategy similar in spirit to the
fundamentalist. See Williams (2012: 167).
31 It’s easy to see how some form of anti-Trivialism follows: if we’re justified in rejecting the
premise(s) of MOAs like (i–ii), settling existence debates by MOAs looks futile.
32 It’s an interesting question as to how ‘‘anti-Moorean’’ the proposal sketched here really is and whether
it could be accommodated by something like WEAK MOOREANISM. My response to the former is that it’s
anti-Moorean in the sense that common sense doesn’t count for much: it only guides initial inquiry and
can be overturned by compelling philosophical arguments to the contrary. I take it that no Moorean would
be happy with this outcome. As for whether this ‘‘anti-Mooreanism’’ coheres with WEAK MOOREANISM: it
doesn’t insofar as proponents of WEAK MOOREANISM only believe it’s every blue moon (if ever actually the
case) that common sense can be philosophically overturned. The anti-Mooreanism here says that this
happens more frequently than proponents of WEAK MOOREANISM are comfortable conceding.
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stringent, we could slide back into Mooreanism; but if the conditions are too permissive,
we could end up with something deeply unprincipled, or worse, incoherent.
Let’s zoom out. What I think our puzzle and possible solutions point to are two
different ways of conceiving of Moorean knowledge: is Moorean knowledge
‘‘metaphysically transparent’’ or is it ‘‘metaphysically opaque’’? Consider the kind
of Moorean under scrutiny here. The reason such a Moorean might find
compatibilist strategies like paraphrase or fundamentalism unconvincing is because
they believe Moorean knowledge is transparent: knowledge of what there is and
what things are like is fairly easy to obtain. Knowing that there are many
tables before me entails knowing that tables—composite objects—really exist. So, if
you know the Moorean facts, then you know what really exists.
But if Moorean knowledge is opaque, one can’t just know that composite objects
really exist merely on the basis of knowing the Moorean facts (e.g., that there are many
tables before me); for knowing the Moorean facts doesn’t necessarily entail knowing
what’s metaphysically or ontologically the case. The fact that there are many
tables before me is compatible with a variety of metaphysical worldviews, including
the nihilists’ which insists that there are no tables at all, just simples arranged table-
wise. This is the compatibilist gambit: one gets to hold on to common sense and radical
ontology but only on the condition that Moorean knowledge is metaphysically opaque.
If you’re sympathetic to the opacity of Moorean knowledge, then it seems the
puzzle disappears: all the positive Moorean facts are true (non-fundamentally-
speaking), while all the negative Moorean facts are true (fundamentally-speaking).
This in itself invites some questions (why, for example, are only negative Moorean
facts true, fundamentally-speaking) and those sympathetic to the transparency of
Moorean knowledge can always push back and complain that compatibilist
strategies like fundamentalism aren’t commonsensical or Moorean enough; that the
motivation to save common sense is undercut by what the compatibilist claims
common sense is compatible with: that there really are no tables at all. Yet, if one is
sympathetic to the transparency of Moorean knowledge, then it looks like one is
saddled with the puzzle. But our puzzle seems to cry out for a seachange:
philosophical arguments need to be capable of undermining Moorean common
sense or else they land the Moorean in paradox.
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